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STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN WELLS, 1 
Plaintiff and Appellant, j 
™- ( Case No. 
CITY COURT OF LOGAN C I T Y , / 13824 
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF I 
UTAH, j 
Defendant and Rcs/x indent. J 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is a civil action brought by Plaintiff, who is 
the Defendant in a Logan City Court criminal case, for 
an extraordinary writ (prohibition) under Rule 65 B(b) 
(4), U. R. C. P., commanding Defendant (City Court) 
to desist and refrain from any further proceedings in the 
case of the State of Utah vs. John G. Wells. 
DISPOSITION IN UJWIW COURT 
The Court denied Plaintiff's Petition for a Writ of 
Prohibition and held that the Wellsville town Justice 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Court had no jurisdiction over the misdemeanor and that 
the Defendant (Logan City Court) had exclusive juris-
diction over all matters occurring in Logan City and all 
unincorporated areas of Cache County. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Appellant seeks reversal of the Court's 
Order Denying Plaintiff's Request for Writ of Prohibition 
and seeks an Order of the Supreme Court making the 
Writ of Prohibition absolute. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Plaintiff and Appellant, John G. Wells, is the De-
fendant in a criminal case, pending in Logan City Court, 
entitled State of Utah vs. John G. Wells. 
On the 16th day of March, 1974, the Plaintiff and 
Appellant was arrested by an officer of the Utah High-
way Patrol, at the intersection of State Road 85 and 
State Road 23 approximately 1 mile from Wellsville, 
Cache County, Utah. The point of arrest was approxi-
mately 5 miles from Both Hyrum, Cache County, Utah 
and Mendon, Cache County, Utah. The point of arrest 
was nine miles from Logan, Cache County Utah. The 
Plaintiff and Appellant was charged under a Complaint 
and Notice to Appear, No. K018630, with the crime of 
driving under the influence of intoxicants. 
There is a Justice of the Peace Court at Wellsville, 
Cache County, Utah, occupied by Merrill L. Green, who 
resides and has his office in said town and is admittedly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the nearest and most accessible court (R. City Court 15). 
There is a Justice of the Peace Court in Hyrum, Cache 
County, Utah, occupied by LeGrand Christensen, who 
maintains his home and office in said town. There is a 
Justice of the Peace Court in Mendon, Cache County, 
Utah, occupied by Charles R. Zarker, who maintains 
his home and office in said town. There is a City Court 
in Logan, Cache County, Utah (Defendant and Respon-
dent in this appeal) (R. City Court 15). 
The officer did not take the Plaintiff and Appellant 
before any of said Justices of the Peace, nor to said De-
fendant City Court, nor before any justice of the peace 
or magistrate, but took the Plaintiff and Appellant to 
the Cache County Jail at Logan, Utah, where he was 
booked, posted bail and ultimately released (R. City 
Court 9). 
Although said ticket complaint contained on it a 
promise to appear, with a line for the signature of the 
accused person, the Plaintiff and Appellant did not sign 
said ticket complaint, but was notified to appear before 
the said Defendant City Court of Logan, Utah, on the 
26th day of March, 1974 (Exhibit 1 City Court). 
Section 41-6-166, 7 of the Utah Code Annotated and 
the Supreme Court rule adopted on January 7th, 1959 
provides for the commencement of actions involving an 
arrest without a warrant upon a charge of driving while 
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, by the filing of 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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a ticket complaint in lieu of a formal complaint under 
oath required by Section 77-57-2, Utah Code Annotated. 
The highway patrol officer attempted to follow said pro-
visions in the commencement of this action against the 
Plaintiff and Appellant. 
Section 41-6-166, provides as follows: 
"Whenever any person is arrested for any viola-
tion of this act punishable as a disdemeanor, 
the arrested person shall be immediately taken 
before a magistrate within the county in which 
the offense charged is alleged to have been com-
mitted and who has jurisdiction of such offense 
and is nearest or most accessible with reference 
to the place where said arrest is made, in any 
of the following cases: 
1 
2. When the person is arrested upon a charge 
of driving while under the influence of intoxicat-
ing liquor or narcotic drugs. 
3 
Section 41-6-167, provides as follows: 
"NOTICE TO APPEAR IN COURT — CON-
TENTS — PROMISES TO COMPLY — SIGN-
ING — RELEASE FROM CUSTODY — OFFI-
CIAL MISCONDUCT. 
(a) Upon any violation of this act punishable 
as a misdemeanor, whenever a person is im-
mediately taken before a magistrate as hereinbe-
fore provided, the police officer shall prepare in 
triplicate or more copies of a written notice to 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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appeal in court containing the name and ad-
dress of such person, the number, if any, of his 
operator's or chauffeur's license, the registration 
number of his vehicle, the offense charged, and 
the time and place when and where such person 
shall appear in court. 
(b) The time specified in such notice to appear 
must be made before a magistrate within the 
county in which the offense charged is alleged 
to have been committed and who has jurisdic-
tion of such offense. (Emphasis supplied.) 
(d) The arrested person, in order to secure re-
lease as provided in this section, must give his 
written promise satisfactory to the arresting offi-
cer so as to appear in court by signing at least 
one copy of the written notice prepared by the 
arresting officer. The officer shall deliver a copy 
of such notice to the person promising to appear. 
Thereupon, said officer shall forthwith release 
the person arrested from custody. (Emphasis 
added.) 
(e) Any officer violating any of the provisions 
of this section shall be guilty of misconduct in 
office and shall be subject to removal from of 
fice." 
The Supreme Court Rule provides as follows: 
"Whenever a written notice to appear has been 
prepared by a police officer under the provisions 
of Section 41-6-167, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
and when such notice has been delivered to the 
person charged, and filed with the court, or 
whenever notice of illegal parking has been given, 
an exact and legible duplicate copy of such no-
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tice, when filed with the court, shall, in lieu of 
a verified complaint, and notwithstanding the 
provisions of Section 77-57-2, Code of Criminal 
Procedure, constitute a complaint to which the 
defendant may plead 'guilty'. 
If, however, the defendant shall violate his prom-
ise to appear in court, or shall not deposit law-
ful bail, or shall plead other than 'guilty' of the 
offense charged, a complaint shall be filed which 
shall be deemed to be an original complaint, and 
thereafter proceedings shall be had as provided 
by law; provided, that a defendant may, by an 
agreement in writing, subscribed by him and 
filed with the court, waive the filing of a verified 
complaint, and elect that the prosecution may 
proceed upon the written notice to appear." 
Based upon an alleged wilful noncompliance with 
the provisions aforesaid on the part of the arresting offi-
cer, in fact a complete and total disregard of the law, 
Plaintiff and Appellant entered a special appearance and 
moved the Court to dismiss the purported Complaint 
and Notice to Appear in that said purported ticket com-
plaint and the procedure followed by the officer failed 
to comply with the provisions of the law, in that the 
Defendant in said case (The Plaintiff and Appellant 
here) had not been immediately taken before a magis-
trate as required by the statutory mandate of Section 
41-6-166 set forth above, nor had he executed a written 
promise to appear (R. City Court 7). 
The argument on said motion came up for hearing 
on the 19th day of April, 1974, but in the interim period 
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a formal complaint was issued out of the Logan City 
Court dated the 8th day of April, 1974, signed by the 
said arresting officer, which Complaint, together with 
a criminal summons bearing the date of the 18th day of 
April, 1974, was served upon the Plaintiff and Appel-
lant's 15 year old son at Plaintiff's home in Salt Lake 
City, Utah, which said Complaint and Summons was 
on the next day served on the Plaintiff personally at 
his place of business in Salt Lake City, Utah (R. City 
Court 3, 5, 6). 
At the hearing on said motion to dismiss on the 
19th day of April, 1974, the City Court refused to grant 
Plaintiff and Appellant's motion. However, the Court 
recognized that the initial Complaint and Notice to Ap-
pear was defective and on May 3, 1974, entered its order 
determining that the initial Complaint or ticket issued 
by the highway patrolman was not a valid promise to 
appear (R. City Court 11). 
On the 22nd day of April, 1974, the Plaintiff and 
Appellant entered a further special appearance for the 
purpose of moving to dismiss all of the purported com-
plaints pending before the City Court on the grounds 
that the City Court did not have jurisdiction over the 
offense charged, or that if the Court did have jurisdic-
tion over the offense charged, it should refuse to exercise 
such jurisdiction in this case (R. City Court 12). 
The Second Motion to Dismiss came on before the 
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Court on the 3rd day of May, 1974, and Plaintiff and 
Appellant's Motion was denied. 
Thereupon Plaintiff and Appellant filed this action 
in First District Court seeking an extraordinary writ 
(prohibition) to prevent the Logan City Court from 
exercising jurisdiction over the criminal case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO GIVE ANY FORCE OR EFFECT WHAT-
SOEVER TO THE MANDATORY REQUIRE-
MENTS OF SECTION 41-6-166 AND IN FAIL-
ING TO HOLD THAT THE NEAREST MOST 
ACCESSIBLE MAGISTRATE A N D T H E 
COURT HAVING JURISDICTION OF THE 
PERSON AND OFFENSE HEREIN WAS 
THE W E L L S V I L L E TOWN JUSTICE 
COURT. 
Plaintiff and Appellant contend that under the pro-
cedure followed by the arresting officer, to-wit: a non-
warrant arrest for driving while under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor, followed by a Ticket and Notice to 
Appear, authorized solely under Section 41-6-166 and 
167 and the Supreme Court Rule promulgated under 
these rules, it was mandatory that the arresting officer 
take him immediately before the nearest and most ac-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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cessible magistrate, in this case, the Wellsville Town 
Justice of the Peace, and that the arresting officer by 
disobeying the law, cannot remove jurisdiction from said 
justice court and confer it upon the Logan City Court. 
Section 41-6-166 states that whenever a person is 
arrested upon a charge of driving while intoxicated "the 
arrested person shall be immediately taken before a mag-
istrate9' . . . "who has jurisdiction of such offense and 
is nearest or most accessible" to the place of arrest. 
77-10-4 defines a magistrate as an officer having 
power to issue a warrant of arrest. 
77-10-5 (4) specifies that justices of the peace are 
magistrates. 
As the record shows, the non-warrant arrest was 
made about 1 mile from the Wellsville Justice of the 
Peace. There was no nearer justice. Thus, the Wellsville 
Justice of the Peace was the nearest or most accessible 
magistrate. 
78-5-5 gives town justices jurisdiction over the offense 
charged. 
This section gives town justices the same powers 
and jurisdictions as other justices of the peace in all 
actions, civil and criminal. In town ordinance violations, 
they have exclusive jurisdiction. 
78-5-4 defines the criminal jurisdiction of Justices' 
Courts to include all misdemeanors punishable by a fine 
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less than $300.00 or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 
months, or both. (The foregoing statutes are treated 
in greater detail under Point II.) 
It therefore appears clear that town justices qualify 
as magistrates having juisdiction of the offense under 
Section 41-6-166 and that defendant should have been 
taken immediately before the Wellsville Justice. The 
Mendon Justice and Hyrum Justice would have qualified 
ahead of the Logan City Court. Moreover, under Utah 
criminal procedure if the offense is triable by the magis-
trate he has full jurisdiction over the offense and the 
Defendant to try and determine such offense (77-13-17). 
MEANING OF "SHALL IMMEDIATELY 
The term "shall immediately" and "shall" have ex-
perienced some judicial consideration. Herr vs. Salt Lake 
County, (Utah August 14, 1974), 525 P. (2d) 728; State 
of New Mexico vs. Slicker, (N. Mex., 1968), 448 P. (2d) 
478; Fowler vs. State, (Florida), 255 So. (2d) 513. 
Herr vs. Salt Lake County, involves an extremely 
recent consideration by this Court fo the word "shall". 
At page 729 of 525 P. (2d), this Court said: 
"The meaning of the word shall is ordinarily 
that of command. It is defined in the American 
Heritage Dictionary as follows: 2. . . . d. Com-
pulsion, with the force of must, in statutes, 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
deeds, and other legal documents. The United 
States Supreme Court distinguished between 
the words may and shall in the case of Ander-
son v Yungdau, (1946) 329 U. S. 482, 67 S. Ct. 
428, 91 L. Ed. 436 as follows. 
The word shall is ordinarily language of 
command. Escoe vs. Zerbst, 295 U. S. 490, 
493, 55 S. Ct. 818, 819, 79 L. Ed. 1566. And 
when the same Rule uses both may and 
shall, the normal inference is that each is 
used in its usual sense — the one act being 
permissive, the other mandatory." 
Fowler involved a code provision in the Florida 
Statute that under certain circumstances "the court 
shall immediately fix a time for hearing . . ." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Appellate Court said: 
"The mandatory verb 'shall' makes it obligatory 
on the Court to fix a time for hearing if there 
are reasonable grounds to believe that the de-
fendant is insane. Moreover, the mandatory 
'shalT is followed by the word 'immediately' 
which lends urgency and significance to the duty 
of the judge to conduct the required hearing. 
The framers of the rule obviously did not regard 
lightly the necessity for a hearing." 
The Slicker case involved the words, "shall immedi-
ately" in a warrant arrest, and the statute provided that 
the arresting officer "shall immediately" take the De-
fendant before the Court or officer who issued the warrant. 
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The Court said: 
"As used in this statute, 'immediately' means 
with reasonable promptness and dispatch." 
If this is so on an arrest made after the issuance of 
a warrant, certainly a person arrested without a warrant 
is entitled to be taken before a magistrate with something 
more than reasonable promptness and dispatch, and with 
some urgency. (Emphasis added.) 
The reason for immediate action in a case of our 
type, (a charge of driving while intoxicated), seems ap-
parent. 
A comparison of the two Utah statutes emphasizes 
the difference. In the ordinary non-warrant arrest, the 
legislature says the Defendant shall be taken before the 
magistrate "without unnecessary delay" (77-13-17). Take 
a burglary charge, for instance, where the Defendant is 
arrested without a warrant and the evidence consists of 
a pry-bar, lock picks, mask, etc. A delay in going before 
a magistrate, while prejudicial to some extent, involves 
evidence of a permanent type, and is not as serious as a 
situation where timely scrutiny of the evidence is essen-
tial, such as a charge of intoxication. A person accused 
of being intoxicated is entitled, according to the legisla-
ture, to be immediately taken before a magistrate to de-
termine if the officer is making a valid accusation. In-
toxication, as a matter of fact, is generally temporary in 
nature, based on opinions, and under the law, the officer 
does not have the right to be the sole judge of the fact. 
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To permit the officer to completely circumvent the plain 
language of the statute is to permit him to act as the 
committing magistrate and also determine what court 
will have jurisdiction of the person of the party arrested. 
Plaintiff and Appellant's contention is that the leg-
islature detemiiines this, not the police officer. 
To permit the City Court in this case to take juris-
diction over the Plaintiff and Appellant under the facts 
of this case, and the law, is to allow the arresting officer 
to completely ignore the legislative declaration and to 
usurp judicial and legislative authority. 
POINT II. 
T H E L O W E R C O U R T E R R E D I N 
HOLDING THAT THE GEOGRAPHICAL 
JURISDICTION OF TOWN JUSTICES IS 
C O N F I N E D TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL 
BOUNDARY LIMITS OF THE TOWN, AND 
THAT THE CITY COURT OF LOGAN CITY 
IS THE EX-OFFICIO JUSTICE OF THE 
PEACE FOR THE COUNTY. 
The trial court ruled that in criminal non warrant 
arrests the jurisdiction of the Wellsville Town Justice 
did not extend beyond the Wellsville town limits, but, 
that the jurisdiction of the City Court of Logan extended 
to the limits of Cache County. 
The Trial Court said, in its Memorandum Decision, 
dated July 1, 1974: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"Under 78-4-16.5 in any event the Complaint 
may be commenced or the arrested person taken 
to the nearest city court judge, which is in this 
case the Logan City Court, for any offense that 
is a misdemeanor that occurs in Cache County 
under state law and need not be taken to the 
nearest justice of the peace under the authority 
of that newly enacted statute." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Thus, the District Court ruled that since the al-
leged misdemeanor offense did not occur within the boun-
daries of any town, the "nearest or most accessible" mag-
istrate (Wellsville Magistrate one (1) mile distant), did 
not have jurisdiction, and that the Logan City Court 
nine (9) miles from the scene, was the precinct justice 
of the peace and had jurisdiction over the person and 
offense even though predicated upon a non-warrant ar-
rest and ticket complaint. 
In analyzing the statutes governing jurisdiction of 
justice courts and city courts, it appears that they are 
identical. 
Thus, if the criminal jurisdiction of a town justice 
is limited to geographical boundaries of the town, the 
criminal jurisdiction of the City Court is likewise limited 
to the geographical boundaries of the City. 
The Court relied upon three statutory provisions in 
determining that 
(1) The jurisdiction of justice courts was limited 
to geographical boundaries; and that 
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(2) The Logan City Court is the county precinct 
justice. 
These statutes are: 
78-5-1: 
"Every justice of the peace shall reside in 
and shall hold a justice's court in the precinct, 
city, or town for which he is elected or ap-
pointed, provided that where two or more pre-
cincts are embraced within the limits of any in-
corporated city or town the justices of the peace 
of such precinct may hold court at any place 
within such city or town. If after reasonable 
search the county commissioners are unable to 
find a prospective justice of the peace residing 
within a precinct needing a justice of the peace, 
they may select a person residing within an ad-
joining precinct of the county or within the city 
limits." 
77-57-2: 
"Other than as provided by Section 77-13-17, 
proceedings and actions before a justice's court 
for a misdemeanor offense must be commenced 
by complaint under oath, setting forth the of-
fense charged, with such particulars of time, 
place, person and property as to enable the de-
fendant to understand distinctly the character 
of the offense complained of and to answer the 
complaint. The complaint shall be commenced 
becfore a magistrate within the precinct of the 
county or city in which the offense is alleged to 
have been committed." 
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78-4-16.5: 
"Whenever a complaint may be commenced 
before a magistrate under Section 77-57-2, or an 
arrested person is to be taken before a magis-
trate under Section 77-13-17, the complaint may 
be commenced or the arrested person may be 
taken before the nearest city court judge in 
counties where city courts have been estab-
lished." 
First, in making a comparison and analysis of the 
foregoing provisions with city court provisions, 78-5-1 
above referring to justice courts has its counterpart in 
78-4-10 as to City Counts: 
78-4-10: 
"Every judge of a city court shall reside in and 
hold court in the city for which he is elected, 
* * * 99 
As to Section 77-57-2, obviously by its terms, it is 
applicable only to matters commenced by a formal com-
plainti "under oath" and does not cover either the non-
warrant arrest under 77-13-17, or a non-warrant arrest 
followed by a ticket complaint not "under oath" under 
41-6-166 and 41-6-167. 
As to 78-4-16.5, by its own terms, it is limited to 
Section 77-57-2 (formal complaint) proceedings and 77-
13-17 (non-warrant arrests under the criminal code) pro-
ceedings, and does not apply to non-warrant arrests and 
ticket complaints under Section 41-6-166, 41-6-167 and 
the Supreme Court rule on ticket complaint proceedings. 
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Section 78-4-16.5 allows an arresting officer to sub-
stitute the nearest city court for the nearest magistrate 
in designated situations, but not including non-warrant 
arrests under the Motor Vehicle Code for driving under 
the influence of intoxicants. 
The Court's ruling raises an interesting anomaly. In 
the event the town justice has no criminal jurisdiction 
outside the town, then the City Court of Logan has no 
criminal jurisdiction outside Logan City (the exception 
being those situations covered by 78-4-16.5), leaving only 
the District Court to handle misdemeanor cases arising 
in the County 
The court cites 78-5-1 as restricting the town justice's 
jurisdiction to the confines of the town itself. 
But, Section 78-4-10 carries with it an identical pro-
vision applicable to City Courts. 
Thus, if the language "shall reside in and shall hold 
. . . court in the precinct, city or town for which he is 
elected or appointed" contained in 78-5-1 is to be con-
strued to limit the town justice's jurisdiction to the geo-
graphical area of his situs, the very same language in 
78-4-10 referring to city courts would limit the jurisdic-
tion of the city court to the geographical area of the city. 
Plaintiff and Appellant emphasizes that Section 77-
57-2 applies only to "formal" ("under oath") complaints 
and does not restrict the jurisdictional limits of justice 
courts. Section 78-4-16.5 is applicable only to the situa-
tions therein described and does not expand the City 
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Court jurisdiction in non-warrant traffic code arrests 
with ticket complaints. 
Switching to the positive approach, i.e., reasons in 
support of Plaintiff's and Appellant's position that the 
town justices have county wide jurisdiction over misde-
meanor offenses against the laws of the state, reference is 
made to the following statutes: 
78-5-5, U. C. A., 1953 
78-5-4, U. C. A., 1953 
78-5-5 gives town justices "the same powers and 
jurisdictions as other justices of the peace in all other 
actions, civil and criminal" (the first part gives them 
exclusive jurisdiction over town ordinances), 
78-5-4 defines the criminal jurisdiction of other jus-
tices. It provides: 
"Justices' Courts have jurisdiction of the fol-
lowing public offenses committed within the 
respective counties in which such courts are es-
tablished: 
. . • 
(3) . . . all misdemeanors punishable by a fine 
less than $300.00 or by imprisonment in the 
county jail or municipal prison not exceeding 
six months, or by both such fine and imprison-
ment.5' 
The legislative history of justice court jurisdiction 
is spelled out by this Court in Dillard vs. District Court 
of Salt Lake County, (1926), 69 U. 10, 251 Pac. 1070. 
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The legislative history shows that prior to 1925 the 
Justices Courts were prescribed by Camp. Laws Utah 
1917, Sec. 1784, which was identical to what is now 78-5-4, 
and was county wide. The opinion may be concisely 
stated as follows: 
In 1925, the Legislature by chapter 62, Laws 
of Utah 1952, passed on act entitled "An Act to 
Amend Section 1784 . . ." relating to the criminal 
jurisdiction of justices' courts, wherein the jur-
isdiction was limited to the geographical limits 
of the precinct. 
Then, in 1951, the Legislature reverted back 
to the pre 1925 law by enacting Section 78-5-4, 
which is identical to the former Section 1784 
giving county wide jurisdiction. In other words, 
the legislature restored the law as it existed 
prior to 1925. 
Since Section 78-5-5 gives town justices the same 
powers and jurisdictions as precinct justices, it seems 
abundantly clear that the Wellsville Town Justice has 
exclusive jurisdiction over this matter, as the nearest, 
most accessible justice, and is the court before whom the 
Plaintiff and Appellant should have been immediately 
taken following his arrest. 
The Court has recognized that the jurisdiction of 
justices of the peace in criminal cases involving state 
laws extends to the entire county. 
Although the case of State vs. Town of Garland, 35 
U. 426, 100 Pac. 934, involved a town ordinance this 
court said relative to jurisdiction and state laws: 
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"It is urged by Plaintiff's counsel, that, under 
the general statutes of the state, the jurisdiction 
of justices of the peace in criminal cases extends 
to the entire county. This no doubt is true in-
sofar as offenses against the laws of the state 
are concerned, of which justices are given juris-
diction." 
The Court went on to deal with jurisdiction over 
violation of town ordinances, which matters are given 
special treatment by the statutes. 
From the very beginning, Plaintiff and Appellant 
has objected to his case being processed in Logan City 
Court. Under the rational of State vs. Johnson, (1941), 
100 U. 316, 114 P. (2d) 1034, at 1042, Plaintiff and Ap-
pellant has the right to have his case proceed in the 
proper forum as indicated in the Johnson case where the 
Court states: 
"It is a right personal to the Defendant to have 
his cause tried in the Court of proper venue, 
• • • 
The legislature, if it intended to restrict geographi-
cal jurisdiction, would have done so under the jurisdic-
tional statute, 78-5-5, as it did in 1925, and not be defin-
ing where a formal Complaint should be filed, which 
does not in any way involve the proceedings before us. 
To follow the ruling of the lower court would be to 
emasculate the jurisdiction of town justice courts, con-
trary to the intention of the legislature. 
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CONCLUSION 
There must be a reason why the legislature required 
the officer to take the accused citizen "immediately" to 
the "nearest or most accessible" magistrate. 
Notwithstanding, the clear mandatory terms of the 
statute, the officer and the lower courts ignored the leg-
islative direction and substituted their own procedures. 
A citizen is entitled to rely on the officer and on the 
Courts, following the clearly-defined legislative directions. 
Indeed ,in criminal matters where the officer and the 
Court may deprive the citizen of his freedom and prop-
erty, strict compliance with statutory mandates should 
be required. 
The statute selects "driving under the influence of 
intoxicating liquor" and "hit and run" as special crimes 
and prescribes a "special procedure" in these cases. The 
legislature demands special treatment and immediate 
confrontation. The officer failed to follow the legislative 
mandate, and the Court, even after the matter had been 
brought to its attention, failed to comply with the clear 
legal requirements. 
The only Court having proper jurisdiction under the 
statute is the Wellsville Justice Court, and, therefore, 
all proceedings in the Logan City Court are a nullity. 
The statute requires that the citizen be "immedi-
ately taken before a magistrate", and in this case the 
citizen was not taken to a magistrate. 
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In view of the complete failure of compliance with 
both the statutory mandate requiring the citizen to be 
taken to the nearest magistrate, and the mandate that 
the confrontation be immediate, the Supreme Court 
should make the Writ of Prohibition peremptory and 
permanent. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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